





Increased balance sheet risk due to demographic trends and withdrawal of sponsors...






... and rather high levels of contributions (that cannot stabilize funding rates anymore)...





... have resulted in risky pension payments (including cuts in pensions in pay) ...





... and have revealed the weaknesses of Dutch collective pension schemes...


Criteria *	
Weaknesses of Dutch occupational plans = strengths of "capital frame"	
Clear risk profiles for communication	X
Clear risk profiles for investment (tailor-made, age-groups)	X
Clear ownership rights (complete policies, proper valuation)	X
Able to accommodate elements of individual choice	X
Strengths of Dutch occupational plans = strengths of "annuity frame"	ne"
Advanced risk management based on lifelong income	$\overline{\mathbf{Q}}$
Address behavioral and agency problems	$\overline{\mathbf{Q}}$
Pooling of idiosyncratic longevity risk	$\overline{\mathbf{Q}}$
Sensible way of dealing with systematic longevity risk	$\overline{\mathbf{Q}}$



^{*} Bovenberg, Mehlkopf and Nijman: "The promise of Defined-Ambition plans: lessons for the United States", forthcoming in: R. Shea en O. Mitchell (eds), Reimagining Pensions: the next 40 years, Oxford University Press]

... causing companies to propose new individual DC schemes with collective elements


Gradual conversion into collective variable annuity (instead of individual nominal annuity)





... or individual DC schemes with continued investments after retirement...

Continued investments after retirement






... which all aim to combine the best of both worlds...

New proposals aim to combine the strengths of...

"capital" frame of DC & "annuity" frame of DB







... and require new legislation that should meet the following criteria:

- Individual ownership rights within the collective
 - No shortages surplusses passed onto future members
 - Individual amounts add up to the collective
 - Funding rate equal to 100% at the end of each year
- Symmetric rule for risk sharing based on riskfree rate
 - Ex-ante fair
 - No discretion to boards to redistribute between generations
- Possibilities for participants to choose different provider
- Prevent losses from being shifted (far) into the future
- Restricting the annual volatility of pension outcomes
- 'Duty of care' and 'prudent person'
- Communication that is simple and understandable

